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defendants to remove certain structures and appurten-
ances to a gas station on 13th East Street and Simpson 
Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. The court entered 
its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment 
denying to plaintiffs any damages but granting them 
specific injunctive enforcement of the alleged covenant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These defendants seek judgment as a matter of law 
that plaintiffs are not entitled to injimctive relief. In 
the alternative, defendants seek (1) a new trial or (2) 
an order dismissing plamtifEs' complaint for failure to 
join an indispensable party. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates 
is a limited partnership. Defendants Spence Clark and 
James Collier were, during the relevant periods herein, 
the general partners in this enterprise. The defendant 
partnership's primary asset consists of real property in 
the Union Heights subdivision in the Sugarhouse area 
of Salt Lake City. This property forms part of a center 
of retail shops and stores known as the Sugarhouse Shop-
ping Center. Other portions of this Center are owned 
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by the plaintiffs, Nick, Gus and John Fapanikolas, doing 
business as Papanikolas Brothers.1 
The Center was developed by the plaintiffs and A. 
R. Curtis & Sons Company, but these two parties did 
not form a partnership to hold the land. Each retained 
its individual ownership interest in the various distinct 
parcels of property comprising the Center. Beginning 
in the 1950's, these developers entered a series of agree-
ments reserving certain areas of the Center for parking 
and for the accommodation of the Center's tenants and 
their patrons. One of these agreements, dated March 
1954 (Ex. 1), reserved, among other areas, a 50-foot 
portion of the property owned by A. R. Curtis & Sons 
Company on the east side of the Center abutting 13th 
East on the north of Simpson Avenue. The agreement, 
which was recorded, styled this restriction as a covenant 
running with the land effective until 1999 (Ex. 1). 
There were other agreements between the Papanik-
olas Bros., and A. R. Curtis & Sons, (See plaintiffs' 
requests for admissions attached and included in the 
record but unmarked as part thereof.) At trial, over the 
objection of defendants' counsel (Tr. 29-31), plaintiffs 
elected to rely for the enforcement of the claimed coven-
ant only on the March 1954 agreement and offered no 
1The action was originally brought in the name of Papa-
nikolas Brothers, a partnership. Because of defendants' objec-
tion, the individual partners were named as the party plaintiffs 
at the commencement of the trial. In addition, Warren E. Swartz, 
Marjorie Swartz, Robert C. Honodel, Betty Honodel, Myrne M. 
Collier, and Jill Clark were dismissed at the beginning of the 
trial as parties defendant. 
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proof as to the effect or meaning of the subsequent agree-
ments.2 
Sugar/house Shopping Center Associates acquired the 
Curtis' interest in the Center in late 1968 and 1969.3 In 
October of 1969, the partnership leased the property in 
the Center facing 13th East and lying north of Simpson 
Avenue to American Oil Company (Ex. 2). Subsequently 
these parties executed a lease rider (Ex. 3) which, among 
other things, acknowledged that the construction of the 
station "may be in violation" of the recorded 1954 agree-
ment (Ex. 3). 
Shortly after the execution of these documents, con-
struction began on the leased premises (Tr. 80). Prior 
to constniction, American Oil placed a sign on the prop-
erty announcing that a service station would soon be 
built (Tr. 92). Constaiiction, lasting somewhat longer 
than normal because of land fill problems on the north 
edge of the leased premises, was completed in approxi-
mately August of 1970 (Tr. 80). 
On August 13, 1970, the Papanikolas' attorney wrote 
2The other agreements were not offered or received into 
evidence. Also, these defendants had asserted third party claims 
against an individual shareholder of A. R. Curtis & Sons for 
breach of warranty arising from the failure of the selling Curtis 
shareholders to disclose to defendants the existence of the un-
recorded agreements. Because of plaintiffs' election to rely only 
on the recorded agreement, this third party claim was dismissed 
by the trial court judge. (Tr. 31). 
3The method of acquisition was as follows: The partner-
ship acquired the shares of A. R. Curtis & Sons Company, dis-
solved the Company, and transferred its assets to the partner-
ship. 
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these defendants claiming that the newly erected station 
violated restrictive covenants governing the premises (Ex. 
5). In response, the partnership's attorney asserted (1) 
that the covenant had not been violated and (2) that 
the station was consistent with the use of the property 
contemplated in the agreement. Papanikolas' attorney 
countered by suggesting that the construction of the sta-
tion violated later, more explicit agreements (Ex. 7). 
After this exchange of correspondence, the parties 
had no other contact apart from some desultory and 
apparently inconclusive discussions about one party sell-
ing its interest to the other (Tr. 53-54, 65). On March 
6, 1972, more than 18 months after the station was com-
pleted, suit was filed (R. 2). 
At trial plaintiffs abandoned their damage claims 
and offered no evidence showing how the alleged viola-
tion harmed them. Plaintiffs' evidence showed that part 
of an overhanging canopy, portions of one pump island, 
and one sign were within the 50-foot restricted area (Ex. 
4; Tr. 42-44). The trial court's injunction requires the 
desitruotion of all these improvements and eliminates all 
access to the station from 13th East Street. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE GRANTING OF THE INJUNCTION 
WAS IMPROPER. 
Plaintiffs offered no proof of damages. Nonetheless, 
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the trial court ruled that they were entitled to specific 
enforcement of the claimed covenant in the face of com-
pelling evidence showing very great damage and incon-
venience to defendants from the injunction and in spite 
of long and unexplained delays in seeking enforcement. 
The central and critical issue in this appeal is, therefore, 
the piropriety of the injunctive relief granted to plaintiffs. 
A. The Injunction Was Improper Because the 
Evidence Showed That the "Balance of Injury'9 
Was Far Greater to Defendants Than Plaintiffs. 
As indicated, plaintiffs offered no evidence of dam-
age. In fact, although the purpose of the restrictive cov-
enant was to preserve the area for parking (Ex. 1), de-
fendants' evidence; demonstrated clearly that the Sugar-
house Shopping Center contained an abundance of park-
ing space, much of it added by defendants since their 
purchase of the Curtis property. The testimony indicated 
that no one, including the plaintiffs, had ever demanded 
more parking area (Tr. 71, 74, 75); nor had anyone, in-
cluding plaintiffs, ever demanded that the specific area 
upon which the station is now erected should be used 
for parking (Tr. 71). The testimony established that 
during defendants' management of its portions of the 
Center, there had never been a shortage of parking spaces 
nor a need for additional parking areas (Tr. 74). De^ 
fendants have permitted the use of adjacent property 
north of the Center for parking (Tr. 71). In addition, 
the evidence showed that in or around 1970 the area 
immediately adjacent to the station on the west had 
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been asphalted and paved to provide 26 additional park-
ing spaces (Tr. 70; Ex. 8). This area provides more park-
ing spaces than could the 50-foot strip in question, and, 
in addition, as Exhibit 8 shows, this area is much closer 
to the main shopping area of the Center and the shops 
owned by plaintiffs than the disputed property. 
On the other hand, the evidence showed that the 
damage to defendants from an injunction will be very 
great indeed. American Oil indicated that the injunction 
would ruin the commercial value of the station because 
access to 13th East Street would be cut off (R. 77-79). 
This would render American Oil's investment of some 
$92,000 valueless (R. 77-79) and would deprive the con-
suming public of a conveniently located filling station 
(Tr. 79, 94). In fact, there was testimony that the ser-
vice station had probably increased the value of the en-
tire Center by drawing additional customers, thus bene-
fitting both plaintiffs and defendants (Tr. 95). 
The lower court misapplied the law to these facts. 
Equity does not grant injunctions when defendant's re-
sulting damage outweighs any benefit to the plaintiff. 
The rule, ofter referred to as the "balance of cxmvenience" 
or "balance of injury" test, has always been the law of 
Utah, 
In McGregor v. Silver King Mining Company, 14 
Utah 47, 45 P. 1091 (1896),4 the trial court granted 
4Compare also the factually related case of Crescent Mining 
Co. v. Silver King Mining Co., 14 Utah 57, 45 P. 1093 (1896). 
This later case was finally settled on a second appeal to this 
Court, reported at 17 Utah 444, 54 P. 244 (1898). 
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plaintiff, an owner of certain mining claims, a temporary 
restraining order prohibiting the defendant mining com-
pany from entering upon these claims to dig a trench 
and lay a pipeline. Plaintiff claimed that the planned 
pipeline was a trespass which in time would become an 
easement. Upon defendant's interlocutory appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed, setting aside the injunction. 
In doing so, the Court quoted the following language from 
Bassett v. Manufacturing Co., 47 N. H. 437, with ap-
proval: 
"The power to grant injunctions to pre-
vent injustice has always been regarded as pe-
culiar and extraordinary. . . . It is not enough 
that an injury merely nominal or theoretical is 
apprehended, even although an action at law 
might be maintained for it; but, to justify the 
interposition of the summary power, there must 
be cause to fear substantial and serious dam-
age, for which courts of law could furnish no 
adequate remedy. . . . If the granting of an 
injunction would necessarily cause great loss to 
the defendant, — a loss altogether dispropor-
tionate to the injury sustained by the plain-
tiff, — that fact should be considered, in deter-
mining whether the application should be 
granted, and in some cases it would justly have 
great weight. I t has often been supposed that 
when the right has been established at law the 
plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction as 
a matter of course; and this misapprehension 
has arisen, probably, from the fact that, in a 
large number of cases, injunctions have been 
refused upon the express ground that the title 
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of the plaintiff had not been established at 
law, leaving room for inference that if it had 
been so established the injunction would have 
been issued. This, however, is clearly the doc-
trine of courts of equity; for they will not 
ordinarily exercise this summary and extra-
ordinary power when substantial justice can be 
done by courts of law" (45 P . 1093) (Em-
phasis added). 
Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 
558 (1915), also elucidates the balance of injury test. 
The plaintiff, a jewelry merchant, sought damages and 
injunctive relief because certain portions of defendant's 
bank building projected onto and encroached upon a pub-
lic sidewalk, thereby obstructing the view of his estab-
lishment by passersby and depriving him of potential 
customecrs. Plaintiff claimed that the encroachment was 
a public nuisance. The trial court awarded plaintiff both 
money damages and an injunction requiring defendant 
to remove the offending encroachment. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the injunctive relief was 
improper: 
"In addition to the foregoing, [the Court 
found that the injunction was improper be-
cause of plaintiff's laches] there are also a few 
other features in this case which operate in 
favor of the defendant. In view of all the facts 
and circumstances, what by Mr. Pomeroy (5 
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 508) is called "the balance 
of injury" in cases of encroachment is certain-
ly in favor of the defendant, in so far as that 
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principle refers to the removal of the front 
of the bank building. Here we have a case 
where the street is of the generous width of 
132 feet from lot line to lot line, 20 feet of 
which on either side is devoted to a concrete 
sidewalk for pedestrians. The public, there-
fore, in the nature of things, cannot be in-
convienced to any great extent by an obstruct-
ed passageway. Then, again, it is clearly shown 
that the construction of the front of the build-
ing is such that, if the pillars and reinforced 
concrete pilasters or columns, which also per-
form the function of buttresses, are removed, 
it will weaken the whole front of the building, 
and thus leave it in a weakened condition. . . . 
Further, the evidence is to the effect that the 
front of the building as now constructed is an 
ornament to any city, and to now tear down 
and remodel it will entail an expenditure of at 
least $15,000, and, as we have seen, the architect 
says that even then the building will not answer 
the purposes for which it was planned and de-
signed. Upon the other hand, while plaintiff's 
building is at least to some extent affected, and 
its use for business purposes is deprectiated 
in value, yet the depreciation can as readily be 
ascertained and compensated as that could be 
done if the building were affected and de-
preciated in value from some other obstruction. 
In other words, plaintiff's injury and damages 
can be adjusted, and he can be compensated 
without inflicting any unnecessary hardship 
upon the defendant. May this be done under 
the law, in view of the facts and circumstances ? 
"We think that it may not only be done, 
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but that under the peculiar facts and circum-
stances it is the only way out, without inflict-
ing an unnecessary hardship upon some one." 
(151 P . at 563) (Emphasis added). 
The Court restricted the plaintiff to his remedy at 
law — damages from the encroachment — because of 
the undue hardship on defendant, the economic waste, 
and the loss to the community that would result if por-
tions of the building were destroyed by enforcement of 
the injunction. In the present case, not only is there 
a showing of hardship upon defendants more extreme 
than in the Pingree case, there are no damages at all to 
plaintiffs against which the court could weigh defendants' 
economic loss and the waste of destroying the improve-
ments. 
Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building 
Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099 (1936), involved a rather 
complicated set of facts. Defendant replaced its old 
building, which had a common partition wall with plain-
tiff's building, with a new 13-story structure. Plaintiff 
alleged that both a subsurface shaft sunk as a founda-
tion for the new building and certain parts of its facade 
encroached on his property and that the new building 
caused settling and other damages. Plaintiff sought dam-
ages and an injunction requiring defendant to remove 
the alleged encroachments. The trial court, giving partial 
relief to plaintiff, apparently satisfied neither party. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed with instructions 
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for a new trial. In the course of its opinion, the Court 
stated: 
"Was the plaintiff entitled to a mandatory 
injunction as to subsurface encroachment? 
These encroachments as found by the court did 
no harm. They were completely out of plain-
tiff's way and could not possibly interef ere with 
the enjoyment of its property unless deeper 
excavation was necessary. . . . We do not mean 
to hold that in certain cases a party might not 
be compelled to remove subsurface encroach-
ments into the land of another, where they were 
knowingly made without regard to the other's 
rights and purely for the benefit of the party 
encroaching, and where it could be shown that 
they were a detriment to the use of the other's 
land and there was no laches or delay in asking 
for the remedy. Every case must stand on its 
own facts. . . . In this case, however, there is 
no curtailment to the use of plaintiff's prem-
ises. The mats and walls were not in officious, 
aggressive or ruthless disregard of plaintiff's 
rights, but necessary for defendant's structure 
and removable when plaintiff desires to exca-
vate. . . . The cost of removing them would be 
tremendous as compared to the almost negli-
gible benefit such removal would be to plain-
tiff. The court was correct in denying the ap-
plication for the injunction to remove these en-
• croachments.. . ." (57 P.2d at 1125) (Empha-
sis added). 
The Court applied the same balance of injury test 
to the above-surface intrusions: 
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"Even those jurisdictions which most 
severely apply the doctrine that plaintiff had 
the right to repel what would amount to a con-
demnation if a mandatory injunction were not 
issued, recognize the principle that there may 
be circumstances which in equity would be per-
suasive of the withholding of the injunction... 
In the case of Crosby v. Blomerth . . . and 
Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598,150 P . 962, the 
cost of removing the intrusions was very small 
compared to the cost involved in removing de-
fendant's structure in this case, and in those 
cases if the structure remained it would have 
been an actual nuisance and an inconvenience 
to the plaintiff. . . . In our own case of Lewis 
v. Pingree Nat. Bank, supra, this court recog-
nized the "balance of injury" theory as desig-
nated by Pomeroy (5 Pomeroy Eq. J r . § 508). 
True, in that case the court held that the 
plaintiff might have sooner brought the action, 
the encroachment being apparent from the be-
ginning of erection of the bank front. But it 
rests primarily on the balance of injury theory; 
that where the cost of removal would be dispro-
portionate and oppressive compared to the 
benefits derived from it by plaintiff and where 
plaintiff can be compensated, the court will not 
compel the removal/' (57 P.2d at 1127) (Em-
phasis added).5 
sThe Mary Jane Stevens case cited with approval Mayer v. 
Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 P. 962 (1915). There the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant, mistaking the location of his prop-
erty boundaries, had erected a house that encroached upon 
plaintiff's property. The lower court granted judgment for plain-
tiff compelling defendant to remove the offending structures 
[footnote cont'd on next page] 
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In each of the above cited cases, the plaintiff com-
plained of an actual invasion of his property, either a 
trespass or encroachment. No invasion is present in this 
case. The restrictive covenant in fact burdens defen-
dants' premises. In each of the cases the plaintiffs could 
show at least some actual damage or physical harm. 
This element is also absent in this case. Plaintiffs offered 
no proof of damages for the simple reason that the station 
is, if anything, a benefit to the Center. The balance of 
injury test is even more persuasive here than in those 
earlier cases, each of which denied the plaintiff injunc-
tive relief. 
and also awarding plaintiff $1.00 in damages. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the damage award but reversed with respect to 
the mandatory injunction: 
"It is not true that where, as in this case, boundary 
lines of coterminous owners overlap, and where there has 
been a dispute and uncertainty respecting the actual loca-
tion of such lines, the law requires that either the lines as 
described in the deed of one of the parties or that those 
described in the deed of the other shall be followed. And 
what is not required by the law in that regard certainly 
is not required in equity. In a case like this, where no per-
manent, in fact no, injury can result to the complaining party 
by granting him what he is entitled to according to his 
possessory rights, and injustice would result if more were 
given, the doubt, if any, may well be resolved in favor of 
the party on whom unnecessary injury would be inflicted 
by compelling him to undo what in good faith and under 
a claim of right he did, although he is some slight degree 
exceeded the legal limits of his rights. The rules of both 
law and equity, under such circumstances, can be vindicated 
and justice reflected by compelling the party to undo that, 
and that only, which equity and good conscience requires." 
(150 P. at 966). 
The court then ruled that the defendant should simply be re-
quired to cut off and remove the portion of the eves of his roof 
which extended out over the roof of the plaintiff's house. 
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The balance of injury test is of course a general rule 
of equity. See 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§57-60 
(1969); Annot. 28 A. L. R. 2d 679, 690 (1953) .6 Cf. 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. u. Minnette, 246 P. 2d 1025 
(Gal. App. 1952); Family Record Plan v. Mitchell, 342 
P. 2d 10 (Cal. App. 1959). It applies as well to suits for 
specific performance of contracts. As stated in Trustees 
of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882): 
" I t certainly is not the doctrine of courts 
of equity, to enforce, by its peculiar mandate, 
every contract, in all cases, even where spe-
cific execution is found to be its legal intention 
and effect. I t gives or withholds such decree 
according to its discretion, in view of the cir-
cumstances of the case. . . . And so though the 
contract was fair and just when made, the in-
terference of the court should be denied, if sub-
sequent events have made performance by the 
defendant so onerous, that its enforcement 
would impose great hardship upon him and 
impart little or no benefit to plaintiff." (87 
N.Y. at 316-17). 
In illustration 3 to Section 359 of the Restatement 
of Contracts, the following instructive example is given 
concerning the propriety of ordering specific performance 
to enforce the terms of a contract: 
6This annotation classifies Utah as being one of the juris-
dictions following the "balance of injury" rule. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
"A sells to B a lot with a building thereon, 
l; retaining adjacent land, B contracting not to 
make any addition or external alteration with-
out A's written consent. In breach of this con-
tract, B opens a frosted window in the wall of 
the building to give necessary light for the first 
floor flat. A sues for a mandatory injunction 
to compel the closing of the window and for 
damages. The breach has caused A no sub-
stantial harm. I t is within the discretion of the 
court to declare that B has committed a breach, 
to award a small sum as damages, and to deny 
an injunction conditionally on B's undertaking 
never to claim any easement and to keep the 
window frosted." (A.L.I., Restatement of 
Contracts, § 359 at 641-642 (1932)). 
An instructive example of the denial of injunctive 
relief in a contract case is Melrose v. Low, 80 Utah 356, 
15 P. 2d 31.9 (1932). The plaintiff, a physician, had 
entered a contract with defendant whereby the defendant 
agreed to pay $5,000 in liquidated damages if, during the 
term of the contract, he set up private medical practice 
in Carbon County, Utah. The Court found that there 
was no showing of irreparable harm to the plaintiff from 
the defendant's breach, and therefore denied injunctive 
relief. As the Court stated: 
"But equity requires that he show some-
thing more than the mere making of the con-
tract and its breach. The writ of injunction, 
as all the authorities above cited go to show, 
is issued in cases of this kind only to prevent 
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great and irreparable injury to the complain-
ing party/' (15 P.2d at 321) (Emphasis add-
ed). 
It is easy to understand why the trial court was 
perhaps misled on the balance of injury and convenience 
test. There was simply nothing to balance. Plaintiffs 
offered no evidence at all of any damage or harm from 
the alleged violation of the restrictive covenant. All the 
injury in this case will be borne by defendants from the 
enforcement of the trial court's injunction, which, if 
sustained, will alleviate no harm done to plaintiffs. The 
injunction was improper and judgment should be entered 
as a matter of law that plaintiffs are not entitled to the 
specific relief requested. 
B. The Granting of Injunctive Relief Should 
Have Been Barred Because of Plaintiffs'' Laches. 
"Equity aids the vigilant." Injunctive relief is not 
available to those who sleep upon their rights to the 
prejudice of the other parities against whom equitable 
relief is asked. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions §61 (1969). 
The evidence before the trial court can be interpreted 
in two ways. However — and this is the important point 
— in either interpretation the trial court should have 
found plaintiffs guilty of laches. 
American Oil began construction of the station in 
December of 1969. The company placed a sign on the 
premises announcing to the traveling public that a new 
station would be built there. Construction took some-
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what longer than normal because land fill had to be added 
to the north end of the premises (Tr. 93). 
The record reveals no protest or objection by plain-
tiffs during construction Mr. Nick Papanikolas testified 
that, although he regukrly traveled along 13th East 
(Tr. I l l , 112), he saw neither the sign nor the construc-
tion of the station until August of 1970 when he sud-
denly noticed construction on the premises (Tr. 107, 111, 
112). Not only did the sign and the ensuing construc-
tion escape Mr. Papanikolas' notice, the new station was 
also not noticed by the Papanikolas' manager at the shop-
ping center (Tr. 111). The trial court should not have 
accepted this unpersuasive testimony and should indeed 
have held that plaintiffs knew or should have known 
before August of 1970 that the station was being built.7 
(See Findings of Fact 15, R. 328-329.) 
Even if plaintiffs' testimony is believed, the subse-
quent delays cannot be explained and ladies should ap-
ply. Plaintiffs' attorneys sent their first letter of com-
plaint (Ex. 5) on August 13, 1970. The attorneys for 
the partnership replied shortly thereafter that they felt 
there was no violation (Ex. 6). On September 1, 1970, 
plaintiffs' attorney again wrote to defendant setting 
forth additional reasons why they felt there had been 
a breach. After these contacts, plaintiffs did nothing 
7Since plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, this is an equity 
case, and this Court has power to review the facts and the law. 
Utah Constitution, Art. VII, § 9; Metropolitan Investment Co. 
v. Sine; 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 980 (1962). 
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until suit was filed in March of 1972, more than 18 
months after the station was completed. Plaintiffs were 
aware all along that defendants felt there was no breach, 
and, further, that defendants were in no position to com-
ply with plaintiffs' request that certain improvements 
on the station premises be removed. None of the appar-
ently inconclusive discussions about sale at any time 
suggested an agreement that defendants would comply 
with any of plaintiffs' requests as set forth in the August 
and September 1970 letters. So far as the record reveals, 
such compliance was not even discussed.8 
In Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, supra, the court 
found that the plaintiff, though he attempted to deny 
the fact, knew before the erection of the building that 
the defendant proposed to project the front of the bank 
building into the street. The court found that his delay 
in pursuing his remedy was, in addition to the balance 
of injury consideration discussed above, enough to pre-
clude granting equitable relief: 
". . . we are also satisfied that he did not 
act with a degree of promptness and diligence 
which, without injury or even inconvenience 
to himself, he might have done. He could easily 
have brought the matter to the attention of the 
8The delay also goes to the question of harm. If the station 
in any way threatened or caused harm to plaintiffs, why did 
they wait so long to bring suit? Indeed, the trial court could 
easily have found that plaintiffs' actions constituted a knowing 
waiver of plaintiffs' rights in the agreement. Cf. Proenix Ins. 
Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308 (1936); American Sav-
ings & Loan v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968). 
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court of equity in time to prevent the construe-
• tion of the superstructure of the front of the 
building, or at any rate before any considerable 
part thereof was constructed." (151 P . at 563) 
(Emphasis added). 
In Mary Jane Stevens, supra, laches was also an 
issue. The court seemed to hold that for those encroach-
ments about which plaintiff had knowledge, laches would 
be a bar to injunctive rexlief: 
"I t [plaintiff] was not required to object, 
and if it knew that something was going to 
be harmful to its property, failure to speak 
would not be a tacit consent to that harm, but 
would work a denial of the remedy of in-
- junction"9 (57 Y.2d at 1123) (Emphasis add-
ed). 
There are numerous cases denying injunctive relief 
for the enforcement of restrictive covenants because of 
the plaintiff's laches. Annot., 12 A. L. R. 2d 394 (1950). 
9The court did however say that as to those encroachments 
of which plaintiff had no knowledge there could be no laches: 
"A more difficult situation is presented by the intru-
sions above the ground—the cornice, lintels, and irregulari-
ties in the south wall. We find no laches, delay, or estoppel. 
Plaintiff warned defendant by letter of April 30, 1926, when 
defendant was pouring cement for the 8-inch wall that the 
latter was encroaching on its property. While as to those 
encroachments it did delay in suing for an injunction, as 
to the encroachments of cornice, walls, or lintels, that could 
not be discovered until the walls were up." (57 P.2d at 1125). 
It should be noted that even in this context the court would 
preclude injunctive relief for those encroachments of which the 
plaintiff did have knowledge. 
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In Loud v. Pendergast, 92 N. E. 40 (Mass. 1910), the 
plaintiff brought suit about four months after work had 
begun on a house being built in violation of certain set-
back restrictions. The house was virtually finished and 
the violation did not cause plaintiff any pecuniary loss. 
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was denied on the 
ground of laches. In Smith v. Spencer, 87 A. 158 (N. J. 
Eq. 1913), the plaintiffs became aware of certain viola-
tions of setback restrictions in August of 1911. In Oc-
tober of that year, plaintiffs' counsel wrote a letter com-
plaining about the alleged violation. When no satisfac-
tory response was received, the plaintiffs filed suit in 
December of 1911, at which time the alleged violative 
building was half completed. The court held that the 
plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was barred by laches. 
In McRae v. Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic, 14 P. 2d 
478 (Ariz. 1932), the complaint was filed about two weeks 
after excavation began upon the foundation of a pro-
posed dental clinic and laboratory. No temporary re-
straining order was sought and by the time the matter 
came on for trial, the defendants' building was virtually 
complete. Injunctive relief was denied on the ground 
of laches. In Jones v. Smith, 241 F. Supp. 913 (D. V. I. 
1965), the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was simi-
larly held barred by laches. The plaintiffs claimed vio-
lations of restrictive covenants because of defendant's 
construction of a duplex. The plaintiffs, so the court 
found, had constructive notice of the defendant's claim 
for a zoning exception. And before the matter came on 
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for trial, the defendant spent over $50,000 towards con-
sitruction of the proposed duplex. 
As stated in Reams v. Vrooman-Fehn Printing Co., 
140 F. 2d 237 (6th Cir. 1944): 
"I t is well settled that 'equity aids the vigi-
lant.' Injunctive relief is reserved for those who 
manifest reasonable diligence in asserting their 
rights to equitable protection. Such relief will 
be denied to the slothful where the power of the 
court, if exercised, places another in a position 
from which he will be unable to extricate him-
self without great injury or damages." (140 
F .2dat 242). 
Plaintiffs did nothing to stop the construction of the 
station; and then after demanding compliance with the 
claimed restrictive covenant, waited 18 months to bring 
suit In the meanwhile, American Oil built the station 
and began serving the public. Plaintiffs' delay was never 
explained at trial and is, in any event, in no way at-
tributable to the actions of defendants. The lower court 
should have ruled that plaintiffs' claim for injunctive re-
lief was barred by ladies. 
C. The Restrictive Covenant Was Unreason-
able, Without Valid Practical Purpose, and 
Therefore Unenforceable. 
Restrictive covenants are enforceable only so long 
as they are reasonable and their enforcement relates to 
the purposes for which the covenant was created. 20 Am. 
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Jur. 2d, Covenants §182 (1965). In Metropolitan Invest-
ment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P. 2d 940 (1962), 
the plaintiffs, owners of certain property on North Tem-
ple Street in Salt Lake City, brought a quiet title action, 
essentially seeking relief from a restrictive covenant pro-
hibiting the erection of a motel on plaintiffs' premises. 
Plaintiffs claimed that significant change in the neighbor-
hood had rendered the covenant unreasonable and un-
enforceable. The court held the covenant enforceable 
because at the time of the execution of the deed contain-
ing the covenant, motel construction in the neighborhood 
was contemplated and there was increased business ac-
tivity in the area, both facts making the covenant valu-
able to the grantors. The court did, however, state with 
explicit clarity: 
"The second point in contention on this 
appeal is the finding of the trial court that the 
restriction was not of benefit to the defendants 
but only served as a detriment to the plaintiff 
and therefore should not be enforced. The par-
ties are in agreement that the restriction should 
be ignored if it confers no benefit on the defen-
dants, thereby rendering the restrictive cove-
nant useless but we disagree as to its purpose 
and effect. We agree that there is no reason for 
continuing the restriction unless there is a bene-
fit to be realized by the defendants. Restrictive 
covenants will not be enforced where enforce-
ment is no longer of general usefulness, nor . 
capable of serving purpose for which restriction 
was imposed, or reason of restriction has 
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- ceased." (376 P.2d at 944) (Footnotes 
r omitted, emphasis added). 
The covenant upon which plaintiffs rely provides 
that the restrictive areas were to be used for: 
"Parking areas for motor vehicles to be 
used in common by the parties hereto and the 
tenants of their respective land described above 
. . . and for the accommodation of customers 
of such tenants and the parties hereto, while 
transacting business with said parties or shop-
ping in the premises of the tenants of the last 
mentioned parcels of land." (Ex. 1). 
Paragraph 2 of the agreement clearly provides the 
parties will supply additional parking areas as needed: 
"Neither party hereto will build or per-
mit to be built any building or structure on any 
of their respective land described as parcels A, 
B, and C of Recitals I and I I of this Agree-
ment, if such building or structure would re-
sult in lowering the said ratio of said park-
ing areas to said floor areas unless the parties 
shall a jointly require the additional parking 
areas." (Ex., 1). 
Thus, the restrictive agreement provides that its 
purpose is to insure that there be adequate parking to 
meet the needs of the shopping center. The evidence at 
trial was clear that such needs are more than adequately 
being met. 
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The station, so the record reveals, is situated on the 
east end of the Center, far from the main buildings and 
parking areas (Ex. 8). The record reveals no demand 
by any tenant, by the plaintiffs, or by anyone else that 
the leased premises be used for additional parking (Tr. 
75). As pointed out, the area immediately to the west 
of the sitation was asphalted in about 1970 to provide 
26 parking spaces not available at the time of the exe-
cution of Exhibit 1 (Tr. 70; Ex. 8). Perhaps even more 
significantly, the property owned by the Papanikolas 
Bros, directly west of this recently provided parking space 
has never been asphalted or improved for parking (Tr. 
72; Ex. 8). If there were a need for additional parking 
in the Center, the question is obvious: Why are not 
plaintiffs improving and using this area for that purpose? 
The evidence revealed that the 699 spaces currently 
provided in the Center are ample (Tr. 71). There has 
never been a time when the demands upon the Center 
exceeded the available parking space (Tr. 74). In addi-
tion, as testified at trial, defendants have supplied from 
property adjacent to the north of the Center some addi-
tional 45 parking spaces to be used by the tenants and 
patrons of the Center (Tr. 71). The evidence thus shows 
that, as a matter of law, the enforcement of the claimed 
covenant with respect to the 50-foot strip on the east 
end of the Center is unreasonable, because such enforce-
ment does nothing to benefit plaintiffs, but produces 
great injury to defendants on the basis of a covenant 
the purposes of which are clearly being fulfilled. 
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D. The March 1954 Agreement Is Ambiguous, 
the Evidence Reveals That Plaintiffs Tacitly 
Recognize Such Ambiguity, and Such an Agree-
ment Should Therefore Not Be Specifically and 
Strictly Enforced by Injunctive Relief against 
Defendants. 
Restrictive covenants restrict the free use and aliena-
tion of property and are, therefore, not favored in the 
law. 7 Thompson on Real Property, §3567 (Perm. Ed. 
1940); Sine v. Western Travel, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 61, 426 
P. 2d 9 (1967); Cf. Wade v. Dorius, 52 Utah 310, 173 
P. 564 (1918); Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 14 Utah 2d 366, 
384 P. 2d 591 (1963). 
As pointed out, the alleged restrictive covenant con-
tains two provisions. It provides that the areas desig-
nated are "to be used in common by the parties hereto 
and the tenants of their respective land . . . for the ac-
commodation of such tenants and the parties hereto, 
while transacting business with said parties or shopping 
in the premises of the tenants of the last mentioned 
parcels of land" (Ex. 1). The erection of the service 
station is perfectly consistent with this language. Plain-
tiffs seem to admit the validity of this position. The 
original August 13 letter of plaintiffs' attorneys to Mr. 
Clark and Mr. Collier claimed that the American Oil 
station violated agreements of June 8, 1953, and July 
14, 1965 (Ex. 5). In response thereto, defendants' at-
torneys upon review of the March 24, 1954, agreement 
stated: 
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"Among other thing, that agreement pro-
vided that the 50-feet abutting 13th East is to 
be used 
'for the accommodation of customers 
of such tenants . . . while transacting 
business with said parties or shopping in 
the premises of the tenants . . . ' " (Ex. 6). 
Plaintiffs' response to the August 25 letter is inter-
esting. Rather than deny defendants' position, the let-
ter asserts that the March 24, 1954, agreement was modi-
fied and presumably clarified by agreements of April 21, 
1958, and July 14, 1965. Indeed, the letter claimed that 
it is the July 14, 1965, agreement prohibiting building 
on the premises that is controlling. Plaintiffs, obviously 
recognizing the inherent ambiguities in the original agree-
ment, sought to assert the unrecorded agreements of 
which defendants hiad no knowledge as a basis for this 
claimed violation of a restrictive covenant. (See Affi-
davits of Spence Clark and Frederick S. Prince, Jr.; R. 
284-288; 61-67). 
In fact, until the day of trial plaintiffs' legal theory 
depended on the validity of the 1965 agreement. The 
original complaint, alleging only one cause of action, was 
based on this later agreement (R. 2-5* 9). The amended 
complaint, though adding additional claims under other 
agreements, was also based in part on the 1965 document 
(R. 69-86). Plaintiffs no doubt chose to rely originally 
on the 1965 agreement because of that document's re-
striction on building on the east 50 feet adjacent to 13th 
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East. In so doing, plaintiffs were apparently concerned 
about the ambiguity and difficulty of enforcing the orig-
inal 1954 recorded agreement. For reasons of their own,10 
plaintiffs chose ait trial to rely only on the original re-
corded agreement. The effeot of this practical choice, 
because of the ruling of the court permitting plaintiffs 
to do so, was to deprive defendants of their opportunity 
to show the ambiguity in the agreement. Defendants 
should have had the opportunity to do no more than 
plaintiffs were doing in their own correspendence. In 
any event, plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They 
cannot maintain in correspondence that it is the sub-
sequent agreements which clarify the original am-
biguities and detemiine the extent of the defendants' 
rights, and then come into court and claim, on the basis 
of the original agreement, that there has been a viola-
tion of the restrictive covenant. 
POINT II. 
THE T R I A L C O U R T SHOULD HAVE 
GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR 
FAILURE TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE 
PARTY. 
At trial, American Oil's counsel represented to the 
court that Americal Qil Company had subleased the 
10Plaintiffs probably made this choice because it was clear 
that none of the defendants had any notice of the subsequent 
agreements. 
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premises to one Peter R. Murdock (Tr. 4). Apparently 
this fetct was discovered by American Oil's attorneys only 
the Friday before the trial which began on a Monday. 
Mr. Murdock was not notified of the trial nor of any of 
the previous proceedings in the case (Tr. 5). 
An indispensable party is one whose presence is 
needed for a full and complete adjudication of the con-
troversy. Rule 19(a), U. R. C. P.; 3A Moore's Federal 
Practice, H19.01-l[2]; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 
15 L. Ed. 447 (1855); Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co., 
94 Utah 134, 76 P. 2d 234 (1938); Cf. Stone v. Salt Lake 
City, 11 Utah 2d 796, 356 P. 2d 631 (1960); Baten v. 
Nom P. Fletcher Mineral Co., 198 F. 2d 629 (5th Cir. 
1952). 
Mr. Murdock would not be an indispensable party 
in an action for money damages for breach of contract. 
If, however, his lease agreement with American Oil gives 
him control and possession of the premises, his presence 
in these proceedings is essential. The court's judgment 
is directed to the defendant American Oil Company to 
remove all "buildings, structures, signs, posts,, paving, 
landscaping or other construction" from the designated 
areas (R. 333-35).lx If American Oil does not, however, 
have possessory control of the premises, compliance with 
the judgment may force it to violate its sublease agree-
ment with Mr. Murdock. 
"This provision of the judgment is particularly difficult 
to understand. If the covenants were to provide areas for park-
ing, why should paving, the prime essential of good parking 
areas, be removed? 
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Murdock has another reason to complain. The order, 
assuming arguendo that American Oil is entitled to enter 
the premises to comply, in effect puts Murdock out of 
business, takes away his livelihood, and threatens him 
with possible irreparable harm, all with no opportunity 
to be heard and to present his case. To say that he 
has a potential action against American Oil for damages 
is small consolation for one left only with the prospect 
of possibly protracted litigation. Due process and the 
law of indispensable painties demands that the sublessee 
be heard before the allegedly offending appurtenances 
can be removed. 
The motion to dismiss for failure to join an indis-
pensable party may be made at any time. 3A Moore's 
Federal Practice, 1U9.19. In Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch 
Co., supra, the court quoted with approval the following 
language from the Illinois case of Gaumer v. Snedeker, 
330 111. 511, 162 N. E. 137 (1928): 
"Whenever a party has been omitted 
whose presence is so indispensable to a decision 
of the case upon its merits that a final decree 
cannot be made without materially affecting 
his interests, the court should not proceed to a 
decision of the case upon the merits. The objec-
tion may be made by a party at the hearing or 
on appeal or error, and the court will upon its 
own motion take notice of the omission and re-
quire the omitted party to be made a party 
to the litigation even though no objection is 
made by any party litigant." (76 P.2d at 240). 
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CONCLUSION 
The balance of equities in this case clearly prepon-
derates in favor of defendants. To force compliance with 
the restrictive covenant is to impose great loss on de-
fendants, to deprive the public of a conveniently located 
service station, to disregard the rights of an indispensable 
party, all in the face of no harm or damage to plaintiffs. 
In fact, plaintiffs' own position with respect to the 
claimed covenant implicitly admits that the service sta-
tion is consistent with the purposes of the March 24, 
1954, agreement, or at least that that agreement is so 
ambiguous that enforcement of the restrictive covenant 
is improper as a matter of law. The judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD, 
MILLER & GELDZAHLER 
Kenneth W. Yeates 
J. Rand Hirschi 
Attorneys for 
Certain Appellants 
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